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Abstract 
Existing literature suggests that microfinance institutions (MFIs)  are likely to operate in different institutional 
environments. Unlike retail banks, MFIs bridge two institutional settings: the formal environment, in which they 
source their funding and in which they are legally embedded, and the informal environment, in which they 
operate. This study contributes to a growing literature on microfinance performance by investigating whether the 
institutional environment of the host country matters for MFIs performance. Using panel data corresponding to 
167 MFIs for the period 1997-2008, System GMM Estimator is applied to determine the extent to which 
institutions affect microfinance performance. Estimation results reveals that MFIs profitability is non-negligibly 
driven by the surrounding institutional environment. Specifically, MFIs are more profitable in countries with 
political stability, effective and predictable rule of law. However, the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to MFIs 
age.  
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1. Introduction 
The Microbanking Bulletin 2010 1  shows that for the years 2005-2008, microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
operating in Africa consistently posted negative profits. On the contrary, those operating in other continents 
recorded positive profits over the same time period. Are there constraints unique to Africa's environment that 
hinders MFIs profitability?  This paper investigated the extent to which microfinance profitability depends on 
institutions of the host country.  
Existing literature suggests that different MFIs are likely to correspond to different levels of poverty, and, 
implicitly, to different institutional environments (Chu, 2007). Much of the literature is however on corporate 
governance. Studies on this front include performance and corporate governance (Mersland and Strøm 2009), 
external control exercised by stakeholders (Hartarska 2009), governance history (Mersland 2009a), cost of 
ownership (Mersland 2009b), ownership structure and transparency (Mersland and Strøm 2008), organizational 
governance (Hartarska 2005). There is hardly any rigorous analysis and evidence documented on the influence 
of country level governance institutions on MFIs profitability. This study is a first attempt to quantify this 
contribution and fill an important research gap. 
Good governance is a prerequisite to secure property rights, enforcement of contracts and for the provision 
of adequate public goods (Dixit, 2009). One would expect a country’s institutional environment to remain the 
same over time, in which case institutional variables may be considered exogenous to MFI profitability. 
However, in many developing countries, institutional quality can deteriorate sharply and periodically as a result 
of political instability, policy reversals, or fiscal austerity programs (Aron, 2000) and even historical origin of a 
country’s laws (La Porta et al 2008). Using stochastic frontier analysis, Lensink et al (2008) examine whether the 
efficiency of foreign banks depends on the institutional quality of the host country and on institutional 
differences between the home and host country. Hasan, et al (2009), extends this study by investigating the 
impact of ‘good’ institutions on bank efficiency in China. It is however not clear from these studies how a 
country institutional development would influence microfinance profitability.  
The relationship between microfinance profitability and the institutional environment cannot be 
extrapolated from studies on traditional retail banking industry. There are clear and substantial differences. MFIs 
serve a more economically marginal clientele and finance small and medium enterprises which are mainly 
informal (Cull, et al 2009a; c). Their service delivery technologies that include screening and monitoring may 
therefore significantly differ from that of the conventional retail banks. Moreover, a number of MFIs are 
subsidized, indefinitely or at least during an initial start-up phase (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010).  
Stylized facts show that financial sector across Africa economies operate within weak institutional 
environments (Anayiotos and Toroyan 2009). Africa is characterized by weak; judicial system, bureaucracy, law 
and order, property rights and political incentives (Creane, et al 2004).  Of the 30 Africa countries covered in the 
2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum; 24 scored below 4, placing them 
among the worst 58 countries. Additionally, 38 of the 45 Africa countries that are covered by the 2012 Economic 
Freedom Index (of the Heritage Foundation) are considered either “mostly unfree” or “repressed”.  
 
1 http://www.themix.org/publications/microbanking-bulletin/2010/09/microbanking-bulletin-september-2010-issue-no-20-0 
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This study therefore sought to address the question; does the institutional environment matter for MFI's 
profitability? Put differently, do MFIs perform better in the context of well-developed institutions, or do good 
institutions crowd out MFIs? These are broad questions that do not find unambiguous answers in economic 
theory. Beyond evaluation of MFI profitability, answers to these questions may provide indirect evidence on 
how microfinance fits into the process of development in line with Ahlin and Jiang (2008) theoretical 
postulations. MFIs are very different from retail commercial banks from an institutional perspective. Unlike 
banks, MFIs bridge two institutional settings: the formal environment, in which they source their funding and in 
which they are legally embedded, and the informal environment, in which they operate. MFIs typically do not 
rely on formally enforceable contracts when they give out loans. This “bridging” of two institutional settings is 
specific to MFIs active in low-income communities (De Soto, 2000; Rivera-Santos, et al, 2012). For instance, the 
reliance on enforceable contracts through the rule of law applies to retail banks, when they give out loans but not 
for MFIs, but who on the other hand rely on them when they secure their own funding.  
This study makes contributions to policy and existing literature fourfold. First, it is timely in view of the 
broader issue of how governance may affect financial inclusion, especially among the poor. Second, it is of 
policy interest to the regulators. MFIs may for instance require a lower risk contribution on their investment in 
economies with strong institutions. Third, although most MFIs use joint liability or informal mechanisms to 
secure high levels of repayment, MFIs that employ the standard individual lending contract might benefit from 
adherence to the rule of law. Well-functioning supporting institutions that help to enforce contracts such as 
courts may therefore enhance MFI profitability. While this proposition seems straightforward, no serious and 
rigorous empirical work has been carried out in microfinance to support it. Fourth, microfinance has become 
attractive to foreign capital investment and foreign investors place a greater emphasis on country institutional 
context when selecting an investment location (Bevan et al. 2004). 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the related literature. In section 3, 
we present and discuss methodology and the data employed. In section 4, we present the empirical results and 
explore a number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Previous evidence 
The influential study of North (1990) raised awareness of the role of institutions in establishing incentives for 
economic activity in general and for investment in particular. Unfortunately, hardly any empirical evidence has 
been provided on this issue in the microfinance front. Much of the empirical work on MFI performance has 
focused on institutions’ success or otherwise with a view of arriving at best practices (Patten, et al 2001; Mosley 
and Rock 2004; Kaboski and Townsend 2005; Cull, et al 2007; Hartarska  and Nadolnyak 2008; Caudill, et al 
2009; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). Although Ahlin et al. (2011) in particular focus on macroeconomic 
environment and macro-institutional environment, their focal MFI performance indicators are operational self-
sufficiency and extensive and intensive MFI growth. Operational self-sufficiency as a measure of MFI 
performance can be misleading as it lumps together genuine operating net revenue with transfers and financial 
sustainability does not imply profitability (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010).  
Another study that has utilized institutional environment as a control variable is Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007) but whose focus is on the impact of regulation on MFI sustainability. With regard to institutional 
environment, this paper makes a point related to Ahlin et al. (2011) and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), but 
differs from both mainly in econometric methodology that tackles endogeneity besides using a richer set of MFI 
controls. We view the results as complementary and in agreement where they overlap. 
The law and finance theory posits that the different legal traditions that emerged in Europe over previous 
centuries and were spread internationally through conquest, colonization, and imitation help explain cross-
country differences in investor protection, the contracting environment, and financial development today (La 
Porta et al 1998). However, contrary to law and finance theory, Qian and Strahan (2007) investigate how 
financial contracts respond to the legal and institutional environment. Consistent with La Porta, et al  (2000, 
2002), they find that strong creditor rights enhances loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide 
credit on favourable terms. In Africa and for countries with similar financial liberalization efforts, McDonald and 
Schumacher, (2007) finds that those with stronger legal institutions and information sharing have deeper 
financial development. This confirms Demirgüç-Kunt, et al (2006). 
Although theory shows that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than 
taxation (Fisman and Svensson 2007), the role of corruption in bank lending is not straightforward. Corruption 
may reduce the portfolio-assets ratio and therefore suppress asset and liability growth (Demetriades and Fielding 
2011). On the contrary, bureaucratic corruption may not necessarily be bad for business. Corruption may serve to 
grease the wheels of commerce, by reducing transaction cost and lowering the cost of capita (Pierre-Guillaume 
and Sekkat 2005). Indeed, Cai, et al. (2011) shows that although bribery to government officials both as “grease 
money” and “protection money,” has a significantly negative effect on firm performance, its negative effect is 
much less pronounced for those firms located in cities with low quality government service, those who are 
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subject to severe government expropriation, and those who do not have strong relationship with suppliers and 
clients. 
There is however large empirical literature suggesting that corruption undermines confidence in and the 
functioning of institutions, (see Clausen, et al 2009, for a a thorough discussion of the identification problem in 
that context). Using controlled field experiment on corruption, Armantiera and Amadou (2011) concludes that 
monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but they cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic 
motivations for honesty when intensified. Along the same vein, Weill (2011a, b) shows that while the overall 
effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it can nevertheless alleviate firm’s financing obstacle which is 
consistent with theoretical postulations that corruption may greese wheels of commerce.2  
Efficient economic regulation reduces government and market failures while assuring that the markets 
function without distortions (Djankov, 2009; Barseghyan, 2008; Crafts, 2006; Klapper, et al 2006; Loayza et al. 
2005). This is important for the development of private investments. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) shows 
that in countries where it takes less time to register new businesses, there has been more entry in industries that 
experienced expansionary global demand and technology shifts. Demirgüc-Kunt, et al (2004) finds that rigid 
regulations on bank entry and bank activities lead to an increase of the cost of financial intermediations. 
Without a proper protection of intellectual property rights, firms fear expropriation of investment in 
intellectual property and intangible assets. Djankov, et al (2007) investigate credit institutions in 129 countries 
over 25 years and show that contract rights and enforcement institutions influence the development of financial 
markets. Their finding is consistent with Djankov et al. (2006) who show that secure property rights are a 
significant predictor of firm reinvestment. Based on cross-country evidence, Acemouglu and Johnson (2005) 
conclude that property rights institutions tend to be far more important than contracting institutions and that it is 
harder to avoid government expropriations. Further cross-country evidence suggests that countries with worse 
property rights tend to have lower aggregate investment and worse access to finance (Claessens and Laeven 
2003; Acemoglu et al. 2001). 
There also a few studies that have examined the role of political stability in the financial intermediation 
process. Roe and Siegel (2009) for instance, draws a link between political stability; economic growth and 
financial development, which is consistent with the argument advanced by Rajan and Zingales (2003) in 
exploring political economy as determinants of financial development. Evidence on the possible link between 
political stability and rule of law on financial inclusion in many Africa economies is provided by Anayiotos and 
Toroyan (2009). Evidence of the impact of political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and 
regulatory quality on financial development is documented by Gani and Ngassam (2008).  
The literature survey presented in this section underscores the importance of institutional reforms for 
financial intermediation. We posit that institutions matter for microfinance profitability because they influence 
the costs of transactions and the efficiency of microbanking. This may have an impact on MFIs profitability.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Theoretical   predictions 
Institutions3 affect performance of financial intermediaries because they influence the costs of transactions and 
the efficiency of production (Aron, 2000). Overall political stability (PS) and the quality of contract enforcement 
in the country may affect the extent of moral hazard that MFIs face when advancing loans. Institutions 
promoting the rule of law may enhance MFIs' ability to enforce loan contracts, and hence increase growth 
(Messick, 1999). This has implications on profitability. 
The Voice and Accountability (VA) index defines the ability of citizens to hold politicians accountable, 
including freedom of press, association, and media. Conceptually, therefore VA and corruption (COR) are either 
related by definition or causally related. Higher transparency of government policymaking would especially 
benefit foreign MFIs operating in Africa. We predict a positive association between VA and MFI profitability. 
Political parties with a long term vision (PS) will not support highly ineffective government (GE) and prefer 
the rule of law (RL) to the rule of the jungle. When government transitions are guided by the constitution, rather 
than coups, government officials are more likely to have a longer time focus and to seek investment for growth 
 
2 Further evidence of corruption on West Africa banks is documented by Demetriades and Fielding (2011), for a cross-section of 120 
countries and a panel of 70 countries by Dreher and Schneider (2010), cross-country micro evidence by Bartha et al (2009) and in Sub-
Sahara Africa by Bissessar, (2009). Evidence for a link between corruption and confidence in public institutions is also discussed in Bianca, 
et al (2009) while that of corruption and competition in public administration is documented in Gioacchino and Franzini (2008). Direct 
evidence on the link between bribes and companies’ operating cost is documented by Ng, (2006), Gelos and Wei (2006). Corruption also 
imposes substantial economic costs, particularly in less developed economies (Olken, 2007; Lambsdorff, 2007; Cho, et al 2007; Chang, et al 
2006; Ito 2006; Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Svensson, 2005; Beck et al. 2005 
3 In the empirical literature the term institutions encompass a wide range of indicators, including institutional quality (the enforcement of 
property rights and governance), political instability (riots, coups, civil wars), characteristics of political regimes (elections, constitutions, 
executive powers), social capital (the extent of civic activity and organizations), and social characteristics (differences in income and in 
ethnic, religious, and historical background).  
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rather than corrupt transfers (COR). Thus, PS is related to COR, RL and GE either causally or by definition. 
Higher values of PS impacts positively on MFIs profitability especially if MFIs have relatively high loan loss 
provisions because of the inherent security costs associated with unstable political regimes4. We therefore 
postulate a positive relationship between PS and MFI profitability.  
When a government is effective (GE), it makes transfers that are transparent (VA). Similarly, effective 
governments use public resources for public gain, so that the public expenditure is not a deadweight loss (RQ). 
Effective governments charge for services provided to the citizens which ensures minimal deadweight loss. 
Indeed the Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010 points to government inefficiency as the worst obstacle 
for doing business in most Africa economies. Foreign MFIs are assumed to face more difficulty in dealing with 
the host economy bureaucracy. We therefore expect a positive association between government effectiveness 
and MFIs profitability. 
The impact of the rule of law (RL)5 is felt through the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary. This 
is important for contract enforcement. Rule of law is intended to create a stable environment within which micro 
borrowers operate; but it may also make it harder for small and medium enterprises to operate thus avoiding 
regulations and tax (COR). Thus, RL and COR are also related by definition or causality. Firms post a higher 
investment rate when most of the business disputes are resolved through the court system (Long 2010). However, 
if going to court is time consuming, this translates to higher costs. The legal system boosts firms' performance by 
improving the trust needed for transaction relationships (Johnson et al. 2002). Similarly Laeven and Woodruff 
(2008) finds that firm size increases as a result of the quality of local legal system. We therefore predict a 
positive relationship between effective rule of law and MFI profitability. 
Corrupt deals (COR) are a characteristic of a black market, where contracts are enforced not by public law 
but by private players. Corruption is a costly, hidden (in the absence of VA) and usually illegal transfer of 
revenues in the absence of RL. Government officials often collect bribes in exchange for a license or service or 
for exemptions to rules or taxes (lack of GE). Additionally, corruption undermines the rule of law thereby 
damaging the legitimacy of the political process (Knox, 2009). Higher levels of corruption may also hinder small 
and medium enterprises ability to operate and grow (see e.g. Fisman and Svensson, 2007). On the contrary, when 
corruption does not hinder micro-enterprises growth directly, its main effect may be lowering wages (Ahlin, et al 
2011). We therefore predict a positive relationship between effective control of corruption and MFIs profitability. 
When a government establishes numerous barriers to conducting business (regulatory quality-RQ), it 
creates opportunities for rent seeking behaviour from public officials (COR). High quality regulation implies 
there are no excessive rules, and that rules are efficiency enhancing. Burden of government regulation, 
inefficiency of legal framework in settling disputes and inefficiency of legal framework in challenging 
regulations will all translate to higher implicit costs on MFI profitability. We therefore predict a positive 
relationship between quality regulatory practices and MFIs profitability. All of these factors are relevant to most 
African countries where the quality of institutions, is poor albeit with some disparities between the different 
economies (Creane et al, 2004).  
 
3.2 Model specification  
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is the profitability of MFI i located in country c, at time t, with i=1, . . .,N, t=1, . . ., T; α is the 
regression constant, 
j
ict is a vector of MFI-specific characteristics (j) of MFI i in country c during the period t 
which varies across time and MFIs; 
n
ct  is a vector of institutions quality indicators (n) in country c during the 
period t; 
m
ct is a vector of country-specific variables (m) in country c during the period t; and itciitc    is 
the disturbance, with i

 the unobserved MFi-specific effect/heterogeneity across MFIs, which could be very 
large given the  differences in corporate governance and itc

the idiosyncratic error. 1
ict  is the one-period 
lagged profitability and   is the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. Thus, apart from state dependence ( 1ict ) 
 
4 This is particularly so if MFI is not domestic as domestic MFIs may be more willing to take on higher levels of risk because of moral 
hazard. Foreign MFIs may also run a higher risk of becoming a victim of violence. 
5 Rule of law implies an open and transparent market, where contracts are enforced by a ‘rule’ that is publicly known to parties outside the 
contract and applied equitably no matter who the enforcer or the contract parties are. 
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ct ), the model also accounts for MFI-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity, and random idiosyncratic errors. This is a one-way error component regression model6, where 
),0(~ 2 IINi  and independent of ),0(~
2
 IINit . 
Due to the significant differences that exist in the microfinance industry across Africa economies, we test 
for potential country effects. Additionally, it is possible that, within the twelve years time frame of the analysis, 
certain developments might have taken place in the microfinance industry and therefore time effects may be 
present in the error component of the model. We contend that failure to account for these two effects is likely to 
bias the study estimates. We test for country and time effects by including time and country specific dummies, 
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Where, D denotes the country-specific dummy variables. icttiict
 
is the disturbance; t

is the 
unobservable time effects, i

is the unobserved complete set of MFI-specific effect and ict

is the idiosyncratic 
error. The augmented model becomes an unbalanced two-way error component model. We test for country and 
time hypotheses separately as well as jointly, by H0: 2 = 3 = ……= T =0 and present the results in Table A1 
in the Appendix. We experimented with many country dummies and it turned out that none was significant. The 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests show that for the microfinance industry in Africa, both country and time specific 
dummy variables are insignificant. We therefore should neither include year nor country specific dummies. 
Hence, we proceed with the estimation of model 3.1 
 
3.3 Interaction effects 
Microbanking is heavily dependent on personal contact for programs execution. Political stability may make it 
more conducive for young MFIs to form relationships with reliable new borrowers. In this case, the impact of 
political stability on deposits mobilization or growth of portfolio-assets ratio will decline with MFI age. Put 
differently, If young MFIs face high costs in identifying reliable borrowers, then the growth in portfolio-assets 
following a rise in political stability may outstrip their capacity to make new loans, in which case their loans-
assets ratio may fall, even if that of older MFIs is rising. This leads to a decline in MFI profitability. To this end 
we interact age with political stability (AgxPS).  
The impact of corruption on MFI profitability may also vary with MFI age. Some older MFIs with ties to 
the political establishment may benefit from corruption, in so far as overcoming government bureaucracy is 
concerned. On this perspective, controlling corruption will increase older MFIs operational costs, but may 
benefit younger MFIs with weaker ties to the political establishment. Since new MFIs are likely to take away 
business from the more established MFIs, control of corruption may act as a deterrent to the growth of older 
MFIs. One would however expect that control of corruption would create a more level playing field which 
encourages the emergence and growth of new MFIs. We therefore interact corruption with age (CORxAg). 
Portfolio-assets ratio may also depend on control of corruption. Controlling corruption should encourage all 
MFIs to issue more loans. We thus interact corruption with portfolio-assets ratio (CORxPAsse).  
The impact of rule of law (RL) on MFI profitability may also depend on the age of MFIs. Mature or older 
MFIs may have established relationship lending particularly those that employ joint liability contracts. Costly 
state verification may be more of a problem on young MFIs, who have less information capital to overcome the 
adverse selection effect. We thus interact age with rule of law (AgxRL).  
 
3.4 Definition and measurement of the variables 
Researchers use diverse definitions and measurements7 of institutions which include political instability, the 
attributes of political institutions, social characteristics and measures of the quality of institutions that affect 
economic exchange. Drawing from institutions theory, we use governance institutions to proxy country specific 
institutional environment. Institutional variables in most African countries are correlated with financial stability, 
 
6 The work horse for unbalanced panel data applications is the one-way error component regression model (see Baltagi and Song 2006) 
7 There are variations in the measurement of governance in the literature. One is a subjective measurement in which people's opinions about 
institutions are evaluated through a survey and then aggregated into a quantitative index. The alternative is an objective measurement based 
on statistical facts on the effects of institutions. For example, the wait time for obtaining government approval to start a business can be 
observed and used as a measurement for institutions.  
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and therefore difficult to identify precisely (Demetriades and Fielding 2011). ‘Good’ institutions can sometimes 
have ‘bad’ outcomes, and very different institutional arrangements can lead to the same outcomes, making it 
very difficult to measure institutional quality (Dietsche 2007).  
We analyze the impact of country specific institutional development on MFI profitability using WGI as 
compiled by Kaufmann, et al (2009) for the period 1997-2008. These include (i) Voice and Accountability (VA), 
(ii) Political Stability (PS), (iii) Government Effectiveness (GE), (iv) Regulatory Quality/ regulatory burden 
(RQ), (v) Rule of Law (RL)8 and (vi) Control of Corruption (COR). Studies that have used similar data include; 
Ahlin et al (2011), Demetriades and Fielding (2011), Cull et al (2011, 2009b), Arun and Annim (2010), Lensink 
et al (2008).  
Voice and Accountability captures the extent of a free media, free and fair elections, freedom of expression 
and freedom of association. Political Stability (PS) proxies the possibility that a government will be overthrown 
by unconstitutional/violent means which includes domestic violence and terrorism. Government Effectiveness 
(GE) measures the quality of service delivery by the government which includes policy formulation and 
implementation, independence from political pressures and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
stated policies. Regulatory Quality (RQ) measures the ability of government to formulate and implement policies 
and regulations that are conducive to private sector investments. Rule of Law (RL) measures the agents’ 
confidence levels in abiding by the rules of society particularly the criminal and commercial justice system. 
Finally, the measure of the extent to which a country is corruption-free is the “control of corruption” (COR) 
index.  
Complementary business environment measures from Heritage foundation capture two aspects of 
institutional development. Business Freedom (BF) measures the ability to start, operate and close a business and 
represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of government in the regulatory process. 
Business freedom is a composite index equivalent to the doing business indicators indices used by Ahlin et al 
(2011). Property rights (PR) is a composite Index ranging from 10 (private property is rarely protected) to 100 
(private property is guaranteed by the government).  
Most of the MFI specific control variables are the same as those used in previous studies (Muriu, 2012; 
Ahlin et al, 2011; Cull, et al, 2007; 2009b; 2011). Additional MFI-specific characteristics are captured by 
controls for share of lending to women. The regressions also include a number of country-level controls. The 
study considers two proxies for the macroeconomic environment; inflation and GDP per capita growth9. Further 
country-level controls include rural population share (in 1990). McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) found 
that most of the microfinance entry in Uganda in the 1990s occurred in rural areas. On the contrary, Arun and 
Hulme, (2008) shows that MFIs mainly focus on the cities, towns and major rural trading centres. We therefore 
control for the possibility that rapidly growing rural areas may attract MFIs with a different profitability profile.  
The regressions also include an additional set of country-level controls. The impact of competition by 
conventional retail banks on MFI profitability is measured by the ratio of amount of domestic credit to the 
private sector, divided by GDP. It is arguably the most common measure of financial development in the finance 
and growth literature, and it is included to proxy the overall financial depth of the country in which the MFI 
operates (see e.g. Levine, 2005). The level of financial deepening can either complement MFI profitability or 
crowd them out. Although McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005) do not test whether entry into the MFIs 
activities by a conventional bank affects incumbents’ profitability, they show that repayment rates declined in 
areas where entry was most pronounced, which should have a negative impact on MFI profitability. Competition 
should also depress MFI profits since they are likely to lose some of their better customers to conventional 
commercial banks. We thus expect a negative relationship between financial deepening and MFI profitability. 
We finally control for persistence of profitability. 
Microfinance Financial Reporting Standards recommends the use of ROA and ROE as measures of MFI 
profitability rather than Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS).  We explore 
the impacts of country specific institutional measures on MFI profitability using return on assets (ROA) as the 
focal outcome. ROA is more appropriate since MFI equity in Africa is abnormally low (Lafourcade, et al 2006). 
It is also widely used in the literature, which allows comparison with previous studies. Debt/equity levels also 
differ considerably between MFIs. Hence, ROA is more appropriate than return on equity (ROE) when 
measuring financial performance across different institutions. The specific definition and source of all variables 
is presented in Table 1. 
 
8 These aspects include: enforceability of private contracts, assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, whether existing 
laws are actually implemented in a reliable and impartial fashion, quickness of court decisions, trust in police and courts, judicial 
independence from the state and other powerful groups, impact of crime on business, etc.  
9 Ahlin et al (2011) use a similar measure.  Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) used the annual growth rate of GDP and GNP per capita to 
identify such a relationship, while Bikker and Hu (2002) used a number of macroeconomic variables such as GDP, the unemployment rate 
and interest rate differentials. 
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Table 1: Summary of variables, measurement and predicted effect 
Variable Notation  Measure Predicted 
effect 
Source of data 
and period of 
availability 
Dependent variable 
Return on assets ROA  Net profits after taxes/Assets   The MIX 
1997-2008 
Institutional environment  
Governance measures  
Voice and 
Accountability 










PS Measures the likelihood of violent 




GE An indicator of the competence and the 




RQ Measures the incidence of market-
friendly policies 
Positive 
Rule of Law RL A proxy for the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police and the courts, 





COR Measures the exercise of public power 
for private gain, including both soft and 
grand corruption and state capture 
Positive 
Other complementary business environment measures   
Business 
freedom 
BF The score is based on 10 factors, all 
weighted equally, using data from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 
Indicators (2010) 
Positive  Heritage 
Foundation 
1997-2008 
Property rights PR  Composite Index ranging from 10 
(Private property is rarely protected) to 
100 (Private property is guaranteed by 
the government) 
Positive 
MFI-specific variables  
Capital  CAP Equity/Assets Positive  The MIX 
1997-2008 Debt to equity 
(gearing) ratio 
GR Debt/equity ratio Indeterminate  
Deposits to 
assets  





PAsset Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio/Adjusted Total Assets 
Positive 
Age Ag  Log of age of the MFI in years  Indeterminate  
MFI Size  S  Log of total assets  in period t Indeterminate 
Portfolio at Risk PAR-30 Outstanding balance, portfolio 
overdue> 30 Days + renegotiated 
portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Negative  
Efficiency  Eff Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Negative  
Loan size LS Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per Capita (outreach 
measure) 
Positive  
Share of lending 
to women 
WOM Share of MFI borrowers that are 
women 
Positive  
Country specific variables   
Inflation  
Expectations 
INF Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
in period t-1 
Indeterminate World Bank 
(WDI) 
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Income growth  
GDP Gross Domestic Product (at current 
US$) divided by midyear population in 
period t-1 
Positive  1997-2008 
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
PCRED Domestic credit to the private sector, 




RPOP Rural population share (in 1990) Negative  
 
3.5 Estimation and testing 
MFI profitability is predicted in linear regressions by the institutional context indicators, country and MFI-level 
control variables. Given the nature of the data, we focus on estimation approaches that are robust to outliers. 
When estimating equation (3.1), we are likely to encounter several econometric problems. First is endogeneity: 
If it's possible that good institutions drive MFI profitability, it is also possible that countries that experience 
sustained growth in microfinance profitability are also likely to offer well-developed institutions. We observe 
that due to this endogeneity, these regressors may be correlated with the error term.  
Second, because of the subjective nature of institutional quality measurement, one cannot exclude the 
possibility of measurement errors in the various indices which may bias the results. Third, countries endowed 
with good institutions can also have other factors favourable for microfinance profitability, the omission of 
which exacerbates endogeneity. There may be other factors, such as geography, that affect both institutions and 
MFI profitability. If omitted factors determine both institutions development and MFI profitability, one could 
erroneously infer the existence of a relationship between them. 
Because of the endogeneity of institutions, the OLS estimation is biased10. Obtaining a consistent estimator 
calls for the use of an instrumental variable for country specific institutions. Since most instrumental variables 
for institutions are constant over time, we do not have suitable instruments to correct for endogeneity. We 
resolve these problems by moving beyond the methodology currently in use in the empirical literature (mainly 
fixed or random effects). We use system GMM method of Blundell and Bond (1998) which allows us to use 
internal instruments; namely, lagged levels and lagged differences.  
MFIs profitability outcome may be highly persistent so the lagged levels might be very weak instruments 
for the first differenced equations. In this situation, the first-differenced GMM estimator potentially suffers from 
a downward bias (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Thus the additional set of first-differenced instruments and 
equations in levels make the system GMM estimator more efficient by overcoming the weak instrument problem 
inherent to the first-differenced GMM estimator. We instrument for all regressors except for those which are 
clearly exogenous.  
The last challenge is the risk of omitted variables. To that end, we follow a general to specific strategy by 
estimating an equation with all possible regressors according to the existing literature. Finally, to confirm the 
validity of the instruments, we perform Hansen's or Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which is 
asymptotically distributed as )(
2 k where k  denotes the number of over-identifying restrictions. We also test 
whether Arellano-Bond orthogonality conditions are fulfilled. 
 
3.6 Data  
The data sample contains 2,004 observations corresponding to 167 MFIs for the period 1997-2008. The dataset 
was assembled from four sources namely the MIX Market database, World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
World Bank―World Governance Indicators11 (WGI). We also used complementary institutional data from the 
Heritage Foundation.12 Economic performance control variables are per capita GDP growth and private credit as 
a fraction of GDP. Auxiliary indicators, include inflation and rural population share (in 1990). These were 
obtained from WDI. We merge the MFI level dataset with country-level data from WDI on macroeconomic 
variables and institutional development indices from WGI, for each of the countries and years corresponding to 
MFI’s in the dataset. The WGI aggregate indicators for all periods, as well as virtually all of the underlying 
indicators, are described and discussed in Kaufmann et al. (2009) and available at www.govindicators.org. For 
some years (1997,1999 and 2001) data is missing. Consistent with Lensink et al. (2008), the study proxies values 
for the missing years by interpolating the data.  
 
 
10 The estimation methods based on the OLS principle are vulnerable to the omitted variable bias if some important determinants of MFI 
profitability are not included among the regressors. 
11 Governance can be broadly defined as the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, et al  2009) 
12 http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
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4. Empirical findings and discussion 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows summary statistics. The minimum values are a clear indication that governance is negatively 
skewed, which may impede on MFIs performance. Negative means in the sample indicate that Africa economies 
perform below the worldwide average in terms of institutional quality. It is a matter of considerable concern that 
governance institutions in Africa are on average quite weak. This is consistent with studies that have found 
strong positive effect of governance on development (See e.g. Ritzen et al., 2000; Kaufman and Kraay, 2002). 
Table 2: Descriptive and summary statistics 
Variable  Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Return on assets  ROA 946 -0.016 0.007 0.121 -0.851 0.830 
Log Age  AG 945 2.180 2.197 0.607 0 3.7 
Log Size  S 947 15.02 14.79 1.821 7.86 20.71 
Efficiency  EFF 914 0.379 0.294 0.285 0.025 1.92 
Portfolio at Risk PAR 937 0.066 0.037 0.093 0 0.737 
Capital  CAP 945 0.369 0.307 0.279 -0.983 1.000 
Debt to equity ratio 
(gearing) 
GR 844 0.257 1.602 1.348 -6.215 3.218 
Deposits to assets ratio DepAsse 382 0.386 0.329 0.255 0.000 0.960 
Portfolio to assets PAsset 805 0.659 0.673 0.173 0.057 0.990 
Loan size  LS 847 0.790 0.569 0.709 0.000 3.541 
Share of lending to women WOM 764 0.604 0.615 0.260 0.000 1.000 
Rural population share RPOP 950 0.687 0.684 0.132 0.390 0.910 
GDP Per capita GDP 784 0.998 2.837 0.845 -2.43 2.37 
Lagged Inflation rate INF 951 0.672 0.062 0.063 -0.090 0.431 
Domestic credit to private 
sector 
PCRED 959 0.1347 0.1306 0.0768 0.000 0.442 
Voice and Accountability VA 963 -0.454 -0.385 0.619 -1.766 0.846 
Political Stability  PS 963 -0.666 -0.408 0.823 -2.638 0.712 
Government Effectiveness GE 963 -0.649 -0.584 0.429 -1.893 0.951 
Regulatory Quality RQ 963 -0.539 -0.444 0.431 -2.369 0.635 
Rule of Law 
 
RL 963 -0.686 -0.616 0.424 -1.897 0.242 
Control of Corruption COR 963 -0.668 -0.717 0.406 -1.576 0.595 
Business freedom  BF 806 55.25 55.0 5.33 32 67.1 
Property rights PR 806 37.78 30.0 11.28 10 70.0 
This Table presents the summary statistics. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the 
variables is given in Table 1. Data has been winsorized at 10% 
 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
The institutional variables show very high and significant bivariate correlations (see Table 3). This correlation 
may be due to a causal impact from one variable to another (in either direction) as discussed in section 3.1, or it 
may reflect the effect of some unobserved confounding factor such as “good government”. Licht et al. (2007), 
for instance show that some aspects of ‘national culture’ affect COR, RL and VA. Roe and Siegel (2011), 
Damania et al. (2004) show that political instability impairs rule of law, in turn stimulating corruption. Alence 
(2004) finds that democratic contestation and executive restraints affect RQ, GE and COR. This perhaps explains 
the high correlations among the institutional variables and therefore good governance correlates with positive 
development outcomes. Correlations among MFI specific variables are significant but the level of correlation is 
very low. The bi-variate relationships follow expectations based on the existing literature that uses this or similar 
data (See Cull et al 2009c). The multicollinearity between these governance indicators precludes the inclusion of 
more than one of these variables in the regression equation. We thus fit a series of regressions, each with a single 
variable of these governance indicators.  
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Table 3 Correlations matrix 
 ROA DepAsse PAsse GR CAP AG S EFF PAR LS WOM RPOP GDP INF PCRED VA PS GEF RQ RL COR BUSF PR 
ROA 1.000                       
DepAsse .066 1.000                      
PAsse 0.65 -.012 1.000                    
GR .172** .339** .001 1.000                    
CAP -.101** -.541** -0.21 -.367** 1.000                   
AG .142** .254** -.002 .110** -.204** 1.000                  
S .111** .213** -.030 .124** -.142** .351 1.000                 
EFF -.524** -.189** -.075* -.130** .216** -.190** -.086** 1.000                
PAR -.046 .209** -.004 .101** -.062 .056 .007 .019* 1.000               
LS .178** .322** .102 .058 -.242 .052* .133** -.198** -.002** 1.000              
WOM -.179** -.415** .112** -.154** .201** -.094 -.149 .273 -.084 -.309 1.000             
RPOP -.072 -.156** .028 -.097** .099** -.094** -.011 .046 -.078* .063 -.081* 1.000            
GDP -.035 -.266** .036 -.070* .132** -.090** -.003 .139** .088** -.016 .016 .254** 1.000           
INF .011 -.119* .004 -.017 .130** -.052 -.052 .227** .102** -.120** .197** -.081** .294** 1.000          
PCRED .050 .002 -.062 -.006 -.125** .112** .106** -.210** .023 -.027 -.012 .271** .003 -.148** 1.000         
VA -.011 .098 -.052 -.012 -.018 .152** .116** .058 -.067* .006 .079* -.328* -.076* -.001 -.061 1.000        
PS -.054 .077 .026 -.028 .003 .022 -.006 .019 -.085** .170** -.036 -.210** -.143** -.039 -.131** .683** 1.000       
GEF .000 -.003 .029 -.038 .079** .033 .157** .090** -.145** -.014 -.020 -.092** .140** .038 -.196** .708** .535** 1.000      
RQ .011 .184** -.015 .010 -.070* .175** .184** .063 -.124** .050 -.012 -.049 -.071** -.076** -.194** .706** .492** .771** 1.000     
RL -.025 .020 .012 -.060 .019 -.015 .058 -.006 -.145** .086** -.067 -.038 .065** -.046 -.156** .707** .691** .815** .730** 1.000    
COR -.026 .101** .045 -.020 .015 -.027 .063** -.007 -.095** .125** -.106** -.120** .022 -.071* -.210** .588** .615** .756** .627** .849** 1.000   
BUSF -.007 -.037 -.033 -.114* .167** -.050 .099** .120** -.019 .027 -.032 .149** .168** .034 -.006 .242** .050 .402** .299** .317** .245** 1.000  
PR .000 .082 -.036 -.092** .115** .033 .078* .102** -.028 .027 .049 .107** -.027 .048 -.091** .369** .195** .496** .575** .477** .386** .510** 1.00 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Where ROA=Return on Assets; AG= Age of the MFI; S= Size; CAP= Capital; GR=Gearing; DepAsse=Deposit 
to Assets ratio; EFF= Efficiency; PAR=Portfolio at Risk; WOM=Share of lending to women; RPOP=Rural 
population share;  INF=Lagged Inflation; GDP= Growth of per capita income; PCRED=Domestic credit to 
private sector; VA=Voice and Accountability; PS=Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; 
RQ=Regulatory Quality; RL=Rule of Law; Control of Corruption; BF=Business freedom; PR=Property rights 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. It is important to note that the robustness of system GMM to omitted 
variable bias helps us in this setting, since exclusion of some insignificant variables does not affect the 
consistency of the results. The hypothesis of over identifying restrictions can’t be rejected based on the Sargan-
test. The Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals is not significant in all 
specifications supporting the appropriateness of the empirical specification 
The results suggest that institutional environment matters for MFI profitability. Political stability, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and corruption are quantitatively strong predictors of 
microfinance profitability. On average, MFIs are more profitable when there is political stability. Perhaps in 
more stable environments there is higher demand for credit, which is channelled to higher-growth activities. This 
effect is however sensitive to MFI age. Younger MFIs are most affected, suggesting that they face the most 
severe informational disadvantages. This may affect the extent of moral hazard that they face when advancing 
loans. The findings complements Anayiotos and Toroyan (2009), who finds that political stability determines 
financial inclusion in many Africa economies.  
The estimation results reveals a statistically significant positive coefficient on the rule of law variable and a 
statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction term AG∙RL. Results are consistent with the 
conjecture that young MFIs face high costs in contract enforcement and costly state verification. Intuitively 
young MFIs may not have accumulated enough information capital to overcome the adverse selection effect. 
Consistent with this finding,  Behr, et al (2011) show that relationship intensity between MFIs and their 
borrowers helps to overcome existing information asymmetries. Access to credit improves and that the loan 
approval process takes less time. Institutions promoting rule of law may therefore enhance MFIs' ability to 
enforce loan contracts and hence profitability.  
Results also suggest that government effectiveness may reduce the costs of doing business for both MFIs 
and micro-borrowers. Indeed the Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010 points to government inefficiency 
as the worst obstacle for doing business within Africa economies. Study findings suggest that corruption may 
make it harder for MFIs to upscale their performance. Moreover, growth of loan portfolio may be slower where 
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there is more corruption. This is consistent with the theoretical postulation that corruption is a barrier to micro-
enterprise activities (Fisman and Svensson 2007). This has implications on MFIs profitability since micro-
enterprises are the main clients of MFIs. Intuitively, high corruption taxes micro-enterprise operations and 
creates barriers to their expansion, reducing demand for microloans. Corruption may therefore reduce the 
probability that MFI will invest in a country.  
The positive coefficient of regulatory quality is an indication that a lighter burden on regulation, efficiency 
in settling commercial disputes may all translate to lower implicit costs on MFI operations with improved 
profitability. This would be consistent with arguments that favour relaxed regulations for MFIs. The conjecture 
that a higher level of voice and accountability may enhance MFIs performance is not supported here. Contrary to 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak, (2007), we do not find evidence that business environment and property rights 
influence profitability perhaps due to low variability of data.  
Overall, the study findings are not consistent with Ahlin et al (2011), Arun and Annim (2010) Cull et al 
(2009b). One major shortcoming with these previous studies is that they do not attempt to control for 
endogeneity. Though unrelated to this paper, our findings complements Hallward-Driemeier (2009) who 
concludes that inefficiency of government services, endemic corruption, regulatory burdens, less developed 
financial and legal institutions all raise the probability that more productive firms exit. It is however, far from a 
fore-drawn conclusion that what holds true for the corporate firms as a whole will also hold true for MFI’s.  
Estimations on the control variables shows that apart from credit risk and managerial inefficiency, average 
profitability is higher for large MFIs with high leverage, highly capitalized and those that mobilize deposits. The 
study hypothesis that competition from retail banks reduces the profits of MFIs is not supported here. This 
finding is consistent with Ahlin et al (2011), who finds no empirical support that financial deepening enhances 
MFIs self-sufficiency. Cull et al (2009b), similarly finds no significant evidence that greater bank penetration in 
the overall economy is associated with lower microfinance profitability13. This suggests that conventional banks’ 
motivation to roll out branch networks is perhaps made independent of the presence and activities of MFIs.  
Table 4: The impact of institutions of the host country on profitability (including Interaction terms) 
Variable Variant of model specifications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged ROA 0.2300*** 
  (2.49)    
0.2050**   
 (2.22)    
0.2089*** 
   (2.59)    
0.1972** 
(2.11)     
0.1798** 
  (2.04)    
0.1711** 
 (1.99)    
Log Age  -0.0036 
(-1.38)     
-0.0039  
 (-1.35)    
-0.0033  
(-1.24)      
-0.0033 
(-1.27)     
-0.0036 
   (-1.34)    
-0.0035 
 (-1.28)    
Log size  0.0354*** 
 (2.64 )    
0.0304***   
(2.32)    
0.0394*** 
  (3.04)    
0.0342*** 
(2.61)    
0.0364***    
(2.84)    
0.0390***  
(2.99 )    
Capital  0.2404***   
(5.53)    
0.2171*** 
 (5.00)    
0.2365*** 
(5.63  )    
0.2443*** 
(5.75)    
0.2262*** 
(5.35)    
0.2309*** 
(5.38)    
Gearing  0.0076***  
 (3.72)    
0.0058*** 
(3.89)       
0.0074***   
(3.53)    
0.0078***   
(3.70) 
0.0072*** 
(3.40)    
0.0079***  
(3.69)    
Deposit/Asset 0.3168***  
(3.91) 
0.2580***   
(3.29)    
0.2876***    
(3.86)    
0.2788***    
(3.56)    
0.2497***    
(3.22) 
0.2931***    














 (-3.95)    
-0.3475*** 
   (-5.41)    
-0.3145*** 
  (-5.24)    
-0.3098*** 
 (-5.06)    
-0.3166*** 
(-5.28)    
-0.3103*** 
(-5.10)    
Portfolio at risk -0.2404*** 
 (-2.42)      
-0.2386*** 
  (-2.47)   
-0.1918** 
 (-1.93)    
-0.2356*** 
(-2.41)    
-0.1865** 
 (-1.88)    
-0.1905**  
 (1.87)   
Loan Size  -0.0182    
(-0.85)    
-0.0234    
(-1.11)    
-0.0218    
(-1.04)    
-0.0228    
(-1.07)    
-0.0180    
(-0.86)    
-0.0241   
(-1.13)    
Women  -0.0211   
(-0.44)    
-0.0023    
-0.05)    
-0.0103    
(-0.22)    
-0.0111   
(-0.23)    
-0.0061   
(-0.13)    
-0.0096    
(-0.20)    
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.0053       (0.14)         
Political Stability   0.0550*** 
(2.27)    
    
PSXAge  -0.0009*** 
(-5.14) 
    
Government 
Effectiveness 
  0.0746**    
(2.22)    
   
Regulatory 
Quality 
   0.0601*     
(1.81)    
  
Rule of Law 
 
    0.0821*** 
  (2.35)    
 




13 Their findings indicate that the standard measures of financial development (private credit/GDP), are statistically significant in only one 
of twelve possible cases. 
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Variable Variant of model specifications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Control of 
Corruption 
     -0.0290** 
   (-2.29)    








-0.0002   
(-0.27)    
-0.00002    
(-0.03)    
-0.0005   
(-0.66)    
0.00001    
(0.02)    
-0.0003   
(-0.35)    
0.0001 
(0.06)    
Property Rights 0.0006    
(0.45)    
0.0004     
(0.31)    
0.0005    
(0.41)    
0.0004   
(0.31)    
0.0006   
(0.48)    
0.0003    
(0.22)    









(-0.62)     
-0.0036  
(-0.69)    
-0.0044  




 (0.78)    
0.1040 
(1.15)    
0.0591   
(0.66)   
0.1285 
 (1.32)    
0.1786 
 ( 1.68)   
0.1173 
 (1.24)    
GDP Per capita 0.0013   
(0.69)    
0.0003    (0.14)    0.0008    
(0.45)    
0.0006 
(0.32 )    
-0.0016 
   (-0.82)    
0.0009     (0.48)    
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
-0.1377      
(-1.06)    
-0.1258   
(-0.98)    
-0.0960   
(-0.74)    
-0.1209 
 (-0.93)    
-0.1125    
(-0.88)    
-0.1509   
(-1.18)    
























AR(1)b    z=-3.8406   
p-value=0.000  
z=-3.8406   
p-value=0.000  
z =-3.6658   
p-value=0.000 
z =-3.7941   
p-value=0.000 
z =-3.7252   
p-value=0.000 
z =-3.8153   
p-value=0.000 
AR(2)c      
 
z=0.5776 
P-value = 0.5635 
z=0.5003    
P-value= 0.6168  
z =0.3409   
p-value = 0.7332 
z =0.5478   
p-value = 0.5838  
z =0.3861    
p-value = 0.6994  
z =0.4658   
p-value = 0.6413  
Observations  179 179 179 179 179 179 
This Table presents estimations performed using Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system robust GMM 
estimator. For the definition of the variables see Table 1.  Robust z values are in parentheses and significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
 
4.4 Robustness check 
In order to test the robustness of the results, we carry out some alternative regressions. We estimate fixed effect 
regressions as a robustness test for the results with the GMM system method, at least for the sign of the 
coefficients and the results are reported in Table 5. Using fixed effect regressions does not fundamentally change 
the picture. The significance and the direction of influence of the governance variables shown in the estimations 
are preserved. Since the proxies for institutional difference are highly correlated, and qualitatively yield the same 
result, we present only results for one of the proxies. 
Table 5: Robustness results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Fixed effects model 
Intercept  1.0475    
(1.14)    
Log Age  AG -0.0021 
(-0.82) 
Log size  S 0.0164***  
(2.77) 
Capital  CAP 0.2466***    
(5.37)    
Gearing  GR 0.0058***   
(2.39)    
Deposits to assets  DepAsse 0.1530* 
(1.75)    
Efficiency EFF -0.3512*** 
(-7.58)    
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.1391*** 
(-2.82) 
Loan size LS -0.0122 
(-0.70) 
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Variable Notation Fixed effects model 
Share of lending to women  Wom 0.0508  
(1.14)    
Control of Corruption COR -0.1410*** 
(-2.91) 
Business Freedom BF -0.0003  
(-0.43)    
Property Rights PR -0.0003  
(-0.24)    
Share of rural population  RURALPOP -0.0164*    
(-1.81)    
Inflation expectations INF 0.1235  
(0.98)    
GDP Per capita GDP 0.0022     
 (1.16)    
Domestic credit to private sector PCRED -0.2147    
(-1.64)    
R2  0.6287                          
Number of obs               228 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has taken a first empirical step to examine the role of institutional context on influencing 
microfinance profitability in Africa. The paper is pioneering in using dynamic GMM estimators and two-step 
estimation method, in analyzing the impact of institutions on MFI profitability. The contribution relative to the 
existing literature is the treatment of potential endogeneity biases. The paper provides first empirical justification 
for the hypothesis that microfinance profitability is non-negligibly driven by the surrounding institutional 
environment. Estimation results show that the positive effect political stability and rule of law has on 
profitability of younger MFIs is mitigated by the reduction in profitability of older MFIs. This findings 
highlights the critical importance of information capital in both developing microfinance industry and reducing 
excess liquidity. Perhaps the most interesting result is that corruption makes it harder for MFIs to realize profits, 
irrespective of MFI age. Results also indicate that growth of portfolio to assets ratio may be slower where there 
is more corruption which is consistent with corruption acting as a barrier to micro-enterprise activities, at least in 
start-up if not on subsequent growth.  
Well developed institutions may actually make it less costly for MFIs to operate in a fully compliant way 
which would be consistent with arguments that favour relaxed regulations for MFIs. At the macro level, control 
of corruption will not have beneficial effects on microfinance profitability, unless it is also accompanied by 
policies that improve the informational capital of young MFIs. The evidence adduced in this paper may help 
guide the sequencing of institutional reforms that could promote microfinance performance. However, due to 
limited resources and cultural factors across the African setting, institutions can only be reformed slowly. It is 
therefore prudent that policymakers prioritize the institutional reforms that would steer MFIs profitability. A 
policy prescription tailored towards MFI specific factors and institutional environment may invigorate the 
industry and subsequently profitability. 
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Table 1: Tests for time and country-specific effects 
Model                                                   LM test                                        P-value 
0........32  CDDD   
χ2 (30) = 126.20  0.8200 
T .........32    
χ2 (11) = 4.19  0.7990 
0........ 3232  tCDDD    
χ2 (41) = 35.44  0.8910 
Where c
D




Table 2: Description of the panel (MFIs per year) 
1997 10 
1998 19 
1999 30 
2000 42 
2001 90 
2002 125 
2003 146 
2004 159 
2005 186 
2006 178 
2007 155 
2008 167 
 
